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
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
An Examination of Mr. Calhoun's
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
AN EXAMINATION
OF
MR. CALHOUN'S ECONOMY
AND
AN APOLOGY
FOR THOSE
Members of Congress
WHO HAVE BEEN DENOUNCED AS
RADICALS.

PART 1st.

DECEMBER, 1823.

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W. C. L. - 1939

NO. I.

“ECONOMY—MR. CALHOUN.”

“Great savings in the War Department.”

COLUMBIA TELESCOPE.

Since the Secretary of War yielded to the earnest solicitations of a caucus, composed of a small but select number of his friends, in the Legislature of South Carolina; to be considered as a Candidate for the Next Presidency, he has made more noise than all the other presidential candidates together. This he has been enabled to do, chiefly by the officers of our standing army, who have also obtained his consent to be considered as their candidate. An efficient corps of newspaper editors has been recruited, organized, and equipped, for the service of the War Department, and well drilled and disciplined under a proper head, established at the seat of Government. These editors have sounded his praises throughout the Union, with undaunted courage and unremitting exertion. If we are to believe one half they say in favor of their youthful candidate, his talents, greatly transcend the limits we have heretofore ascribed to the human intellect. Compared with him, even Washington and Jefferson must be considered as secondary characters.

He is represented as a STAR “in our political firmament, whose rising effulgence has attracted the eyes of the American People,”—“exciting new hopes and anticipations.”

That this young gentleman has suddenly become a star of the first magnitude, is partly explained by the editors of the Franklin Gazette, who very gravely inform their readers, *that Calhoun burst upon the world.* Of course, this luminary has not shed his light upon us by degrees, like the rising sun, but has struck us with all his

meridian splendors at once, and thus be-dazzled and confounded no small portion of our younger politicians.

This is a new and bold experiment on the part of the Secretary, and if it shall prove successful, we shall have young gentlemen bursting upon us from all quarters.

Our Presidents thus far, have gradually risen to their elevated stations, by a long series of faithful and important services performed for their country; and it is not believed, that the confidence of the people can be suddenly gained; by any splendid innovations upon the course, hitherto pursued and consecrated by the patriots who have presided over the councils of the nation.

The lofty pretensions of the army candidate, have as yet, received but little notice, from those who think he has no claim to the high character he assumes, because they have never believed that he could possibly succeed, in his ambitious views. They have never believed that a whole host of editors, could write a gentleman of Mr. Calhoun's age and merits, into the Presidency, even with aid of all the officers of the standing army. There are circumstances, however, which render it important to examine, with some attention, his assumed superiority of character and intellect, and his pretended merits on the score of service.

Although it has been evident for several months past; to the blindest of his flatterers, and even to himself, the most blind of all, that he can have no prospect of receiving more than the vote of his own state; yet his agents, civil and military, are pressing their operations with as much industry and zeal, as if he was seriously to be held up as a Candidate to the last. The objects of these apparently desperate measures, are not misunderstood.—One, perhaps the nearest to the Secretary's heart, is to crush what remains of the old democratic party, in Congress, under the pretence of extirpating radicalism. Another is to gain as large a stock of popularity as possible, to be passed over, for a valuable consideration, to the northern candidate for the Presidency. As to the first, much has already been done under the late system of amalgamating parties. As to the other, it remains yet to be seen, how far the popularity thus to be created, may be of a negotiable or transferrable nature.

When Mr. Calhoun received the appointment of Secretary of War, after it had been offered to Governor Shelby, Mr. Lowndes, and Mr. Clay, and refused by them all, it did not occur to him, that he could by any possible process ripen himself into a presidential candidate before he should reach the age of forty; although he had fully made up his mind, to rule over this people in due season. His immediate aim was to provide a suitable successor to Mr. Monroe, who might *hold on* a few years, until his own character and pretensions should become more fully matured.

Some Presidents have been accused of selecting their successors; but this President, *that is to be*, is endeavoring to select his predecessor; and thus make provision, that the good people of this country, shall not be in want of presidents or presidential candidates, for at least sixteen or eighteen years to come.

It will be recollect that in 1818, Mr. Calhoun and his immediate friends, were very solicitous to select a northern candidate for the presidency. They openly declared that the people of the north had a fair claim to this high office; that the gentlemen of the south were on this occasion, governed by the most liberal principles and feelings, and were disposed to do justice to every part of the Union. These professions of liberality however, deceived no body.

Although no President had ever been elected from a state south of Virginia, which, in fact, is now one of the middle states; yet all the Presidents from this state have been charged to the south, as much so as if they had been elected from the Carolinas or from Georgia. Mr. Calhoun saw clearly, that if the next president should be elected from the South, the claims of the North and West eight years hence, would be such, as not to be resisted; and of course that his turn to be elected, would not probably arrive under sixteen or eighteen years, for which he had not patience to wait. And hence arose his great liberality towards the gentlemen of the North.

In two or three years after he was placed at the head of the War Department, his extreme indulgence to the officers of the army was such, as to gain their entire confidence. They rewarded him with unbounded ap-

plause, and conferred on him the endearing title of Father of the Army. This gave new energy to his ambition.—He began to conclude, that although nothing could be more opposite in their natures, than the Father of the Army, and the Father of the Country, he could reconcile contradictions, and become the latter without ceasing to be the former. Forthwith, he resolved to be the immediate successor of Mr. Monroe. His liberality towards the gentlemen of the north began to subside. It appeared to him very clearly, that the claims of the South, were not at this time to be overlooked. Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana, were to be taken into the account. The Southern states, properly speaking, had never given a President to the Union; although they had been always willing to do so. While this was the case, it seemed preposterous to select a President, from the north and not only from the same state, but from the same family, that had already given us one. A coldness took place between Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Adams, followed by jealousy and rivalry. Mr. Calhoun had calculated upon receiving the votes of Pennsylvania, because his father was born there as he alledges; which most flattering circumstance, had intoxicated some of the sober citizens of that great state. But the caucus at Harrisburg last spring put a stop to his dreams of immediate power; and then his liberality towards the gentlemen of the north, began again to rise. Confidence between these rivals was restored; and it is said a coalition has been formed between them, mutually, beneficial, and satisfactory to the parties and their immediate friends. On the other hand, however, it is alledged, that Mr. Calhoun denies this coalition, and that speaking of the several candidates he declared positively, that each man sailed his own ship; which, probably gave rise to this vastly pretty paragraph respecting him, which lately appeared in the Franklin Gazette,—“Like a gallant vessel on a troubled ocean, he proudly stems the opposing current; and with calm and steady dignity, glides towards the destined harbour, his course only accelerated by the agitation of the element on which he moves.” Notwithstanding all this, it is believed that Mr. Calhoun does not sail upon his own

bottom, but that he expects to be towed into harbour by the Adams.

What is Mr. Calhoun, or what has he done, that entitles him to the unbounded praises bestowed upon him by the officers of the army and his corps of Editors?

Mr. Calhoun was a distinguished orator in the House of Representative, for five or six years. But among those who were in the House with him, there were several of his superiors. Mr. Lowndes and Mr. Cheves from his own state were decidedly so, as were also, Mr. Clay, Mr. Pinckney, Mr. Stockton and Mr. Webster; Mr. Grundy, Mr. Oakley, Mr. Forsyth, Mr. Grosvernor, and Mr. Gaston, were generally considered as his equals. To be ranked however, with these gentlemen, implies a high degree of excellence in the art of oratory, which Mr. Calhoun certainly possesses. He has also the merit of having joined a very large majority in both houses of Congress, in asserting the honor of our country, and in supporting the administration in all the measures necessary for bringing the late war to a fortunate conclusion.

Thus far we are bound to applaud his character and conduct; and had he remained in Congress, his appropriate theatre, it is probable he would have continued to render important services to his country, which as Secretary of War it is believed, he never has done.

Mr. Calhoun was distinguished as an orator, but never as a writer. In his communications to congress, although some of them are much laboured, there is no approach to elegance or even neatness of style. He frequently aims at brevity, but in this, he crouds without condensing his materials; for which reason his sentences are sometimes obscure and perplexed. It is indeed remarkable, that a gentleman of his acknowledged talents, and classical education, should not, in his long and continued practice of writing, have acquired a better style.

As to his ideas of business, they are altogether too magnificent for the affairs of this country, during the present age. His aim has been to surround himself with subordinate heads of departments, who are to perform the duties formerly appertaining to his office, by which he is to escape the responsibility, and the care and labour of

the details of business. In fact to assimilate his department to many important establishments in Great Britain, where the Head enjoys the emoluments and patronage of office, while the duties and responsibilities rest upon subordinate agents.

Of his expanded views of business as well as economy, we may form a tolerable estimate, by examining his plan of reducing the army from ten to six thousand men, made in obedience to a resolution of the House of Representatives of the 11th of May, 1820. In this he proposes to retain a general staff, sufficient in many respects, for an army of twenty thousand men—viz:

- “ 2 Major Generals,
- 4 Aids de Camp—subalterns of the line.
- 4 Brigadier Generals.
- 4 Aid de Camp—subalterns of the line.
- 1 Judge Advocate.
- 6 Topographical Engineers.
- 1 Adjutant and Inspector General.
- 2 Adjutants General,
- 4 Assistants Adjutants General, } These to be officers of the
- 2 Inspector's General, line as vacancies occur.
- 4 Assistant Inspectors General,
- 1 Quarter Master General.
- 2 Deputies Quarter Master General.
- 16 Assistant Deputy Quarter Masters General.
- 19 Pay Masters.
- 1 Commissary General for the Purchasing Department.
- 1 Assistant Commissary General.
- 2 Storkeepers.
- 1 Commissary General for the Subsistence Department, and with as many Assistant Commissaries as the service may require, all subalterns of the line.
- 1 Surgeon General.
- 2 Assistant Surgeons General.
- 1 Apothecary General.
- 2 Assistant Apothecaries.
- 25 Surgeons
- 44 Assistant Surgeons.”

It is truly surprising that a Republican Secretary should submit such a plan to a Republican Congress. It smacks of the army as strongly as if General Brown himself, had drawn it up. The friends of the Secretary

shrank from the exhibition. Had such a plan been proposed by a Secretary of War, in the time of Mr. Adams, what a rout would have been made about it, by the Radicals of that day, then called democrats and disorganizers? All the terrors of the sedition law could not have kept them quiet.

This, however, was nearly the General Staff, in 1818, for an army of ten thousand men, with which the Secretary then appeared to be satisfied.

On the 11th of December of that year, he made a report, in obedience to a resolution of the House of Representatives, asking information, whether any reduction could be made in the peace establishment of the United States, with safety to the public service, and whether any alteration ought to be made in the ration established by law, &c. In this report he says, "It is believed that the organization of the War Department, as well as the general staff of the army, is not susceptible of much improvement." "Every department of the army, charged with disbursements, has now a proper head, who under the laws and regulations, is responsible for its administration. *The Head of the Department is thus freed from detail, and has leisure to inspect and control the whole of the disbursements.*"

The Head of the Department thus freed from detail, has also leisure to attend to the business of the Cabinet—consider treaties—regulate appointments and a variety of other matters, for which his talents are more peculiarly suited, than for the laborious detail of the proper business of the War Department.

As a farther support of the Department, the Major General is now stationed at the seat of government, where the services properly appertaining to his office cannot be wanted, (where there is no army, and where, it is hoped, there will be none, while our country remains at peace,) for the avowed purpose of aiding the Secretary of War, in the performance of those duties, which require a knowledge of the minutiae and details of the army.*

**Not.*—On the 15th April, 1822, Mr. Sterling of N. York, the confidential friend of Mr. Calhoun, in a speech in favor of retaining a major general in our peace establishment, declared that "it was impossible for the Secretary of War to be familiar with the minutiae and details of the army. By this

Mr. Calhoun is freed from details, which imposed upon former Secretaries much labor and responsibility; the consequence is, that he pays but little attention to these details, and probably knows less of them, than any former Secretary, and trusts more than any of them have done, to clerks and other subordinate agents.—And Congress have to trust them too, instead of relying upon the responsibility of the Secretary, of which the above report affords a notable instance.

The part of the resolution respecting the ration, was referred to the Surgeon General, who writes to the Secretary, a long letter of nine octavo pages, informing him, among other important matters, "that man was not originally carnivorous,"—And that "the horse may be taught to live upon meat," and this, the Secretary communicates to the House of Representatives for the information of the members, most of whom were eminently carnivorous, and not one of whom ever thought of dining upon corn-blades, or feeding his horse upon bacon, nor ever heard of any such thing, before this report, unless we except the case of the man "who in pure kindness to his horse, buttered his hay."

Mr. Calhoun controls general results without attending to the details of business. The pernicious consequences of this system are severely felt by the public. He wishes to divide the duties as well as responsibility of his office. Business is perplexed by too much division, and we have abundant experience to teach us, that as we divide, we weaken responsibility.

Mr. Calhoun in his congressional career, was not remarkable for investigating his subjects with close application or regular system. One of his great eulogists, [author of Sketches of some of the prominent characters of the United States] admits that "Mr. Calhoun wants consistency and perseverance of mind, and seems incapable of long, continued, and patient investigation" and after speaking in the most exalted terms of his eloquence, he adds—"Mr. Calhoun is one of those whom you can

officer he can be aided in the most effectual and useful manner, and freed from an intolerable burthen, which is inconvenient, if not incompatible with the discharge of his other numerous and pressing duties." See National Intelligence of 23d April, 1822.

only trace like the comet, by the light he casts upon his path, or the blaze he leaves in his train. But the situation to which he has been recently elevated, has I fear, abridged his sphere of usefulness, and as Secretary of War, Mr. Calhoun, who occupied every tongue during the session of the national legislature, may dwindle into obscurity; but will never be forgotten."

Without a capacity for long, continued, and patient investigation, no one can be a man of business; and Mr. Calhoun although a brilliant orator, was not considered in Congress, as a man of business, in the proper sense of the word. An orator, and a man of business in Congress, are frequently very distinct things. It is easily shewn that Mr. Calhoun took an active and decided part in most of the important subjects debated in the House of Representatives; and we have members enough who speak eloquently and ably upon every question, but who really have but little capacity for business.

This eulogist presumed that because Mr. Calhoun was wanting in the essential requisites of an able and useful Secretary of War, he must consequently dwindle into obscurity. No conclusion could be more erroneous. Mr. Calhoun so far from dwindling into obscurity, has endeavoured to dazzle the nation with the novelty and splendour of his achievements, and his success has cost the country some millions of dollars. He will not dwindle into obscurity, while his magnificent and visionary schemes continue to drain our treasury. He will not be forgotten, while the Yellow Stone expedition, or Rip Rap contracts shall be remembered.

Whatever has been said to place this aspiring Secretary, in the intellectual scale, above the first men of our country—of his acquiring by intuition, what other men can only acquire by application and study—Whatever has been said of the lightning glance of his mind, his splendor, his effulgence, his bursting upon the world, and a thousand other such fooleries, deserves only to be treated with ridicule. But what has been said of his economy and the great savings he has made for the nation; as it is calculated to impose upon the public, deserves, and shall receive more a serious notice.

From the 106th number of the New York Patriot,

edited by Col. Gardner, we take the following quotation: "Is there an individual among the promising candidates, the structure of whose moral feelings and sentiments, the elementary principle of whose character, form a striking resemblance to those of Washington? We most confidently answer in the affirmative. If, since the days of Washington, a *Star has appeared in our political firmament, whose rising effulgence has attracted the eyes of the American People*, and inspired the real friends of the country with new and peculiar hopes and anticipations, if an individual has risen among us, who has checked in the bosom of patriotism, the unavailing regret, while it has mourned over the memory of Washington, that individual is Mr. Calhoun."

"We take the position with confidence, that there is not a prominent man in our country, whose private and political character bears so strong a resemblance to Washington, as that of Mr. Calhoun, and if a resemblance to Washington is a proper test in selecting the next president, *Mr. Calhoun will be elected.*"

As this is the first time the officers of the Army have undertaken to make a president, something new was expected of them. As that they would bedaub their candidate with a profusion of tinsel and gold lace, display something of the "pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war," and so forth; for all which, the public was prepared to make due allowance. But to exhibit him as a *new Star* rising in our political firmament, whose effulgence has attracted the eyes of the American People, is a dashing evolution, an intrepid plunge into the regions of folly, that has astonished the nation. These officers have sent up their young candidate like a sky-rocket, enveloped in blaze and smoke to the wonder and admiration of all beholders, but in this, decency has been outraged, and common sense dismissed the service.

We have never had any thing like this before, and it is to be hoped, we may never have any like it hereafter. The other candidates for the presidency, make no pretensions to the lustre or effulgence of stars, they are decent, modest, opaque bodies, reflecting only borrowed light, and moving about upon the surface of the earth, much after the manner and fashion of other mortals.

In the Columbia Telescope, of South Carolina, of the 9th of April, 1822, we have the following extract of a letter from a gentleman at Washington,—“Calhoun will be the next President. For the benefit of the country, God grant he may. South Carolina has given to the nation, *the ablest man whoever filled the War Department*, and unless public opinion be most fallible will soon present our Country, with *as great a Statesman as ever presided over this People*. I cannot in reflecting on this subject, avoid recurring to the declaration of the lamented Dr. Dwight concerning Calhoun, that he had at one and twenty, talents enough for a President of the United States. *There was something of Prophecy in it.*” !!

Soon shall be as great a statesman, &c. Soon here, means the 4th of March, 1825. If by that time, Mr. Calhoun, with such opportunities of acquiring knowledge as these times afford, shall be as great a statesman as Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison or Monroe, with all their experience, acquired during a long series of arduous and important services, performed for our country, in times of our greatest adversity as well as prosperity, he must indeed, be the most extraordinary young man, that ever attracted the eyes of the American People. And at all events he has very extraordinary friends.

In the same paper we have a communication headed “Economy—Mr. Calhoun.”—“There is no virtue so necessary in a republican government as economy,” &c.

In the same paper of the 16th of April, 1822, we again have “Economy—Mr. Calhoun.”—“Great savings in the War Department”—“By the *splendor of his own merits* he [meaning Mr. Calhoun] achieved *his course to power and influence*, by the force of *his own ability*, and the strength of *his own integrity*, he has maintained *his situation*, daily enlarging the circle of *his own reputation*, and transmitting the solid and permanent benefits of *his administration* into every section of the Union.” Trash like this, enough to fill a volume, might easily be collected from the public papers of the last two years.

Economy and Calhoun are kept together, probably in stereotype, in these newspapers, as if there was really

some connexion between them; as if they were convertible terms; as if they meant the same thing, or as if Calhoun was economy personified. But this is an unnatural association, only to be found in the newspapers. A little examination will shew that Mr. Calhoun is a total stranger to economy.

How did he consult economy in his efforts to perpetuate the abuse of brevet pay to the officers of the army, which abuse, Congress were under the necessity of correcting by law?

How did he consult economy in his efforts to prevent every proper reduction of the army?

How did he consult economy in his wild and visionary scheme of sending an army to the Yellow Stone river fifteen hundred miles up the Missouri, or in the expensive and wretched manner, in which a part of that expedition was conducted?

How did he consult economy when he loaned, or advanced without authority to Daniel Buzzard, ten thousand dollars of the public money, to build a powder mill for the said Buzzard, which loan was to remain three years without interest, and then to be returned, not in money, but in powder which was not wanted, and at a price much above its value?

How did he consult economy in the Rip Rap contracts?

These and many other cases of a similar character, present interesting subjects for critical examination. I shall, however, select a subject for a future communication, depending chiefly upon Documentary evidence, which will afford a very distinct view of Mr. Calhoun's system of economy. I mean his causing 3211 men to be recruited for the service of the year 1820, when Congress restricted the recruiting for that year to 1500 men; or, in other words, his recruiting 1500 men by the authority of Congress, and 1711, by the authority of the War Department; and this after he had been required by the House of Representatives, to report a plan for reducing the army from 10,000 to 6,000 men.

CASSIUS.

NO. II.

“ECONOMY—MR. CALHOUN.”

“Great savings in the War Department.”

COLUMBIA TELESCOPE.

The power of the Secretary of War had arrived at its highest point about the close of the year 1819. He had produced a strong impression upon the Members of Congress, as well as upon the public, that to oppose his measures, was to oppose the administration of the President of the United States; and thus he availed himself, to a certain extent, of the weight of Mr. Monroe's character. He had also produced another strong impression, which still seems to prevail; that he had more influence than any other member of the cabinet, in procuring appointments to office; and, this, however groundless, has been of the greatest advantage to him. It has given him extensive influence, and added prodigiously to the fascination of his manners. It has brought to his party, all the office hunters in the Union; and taken collectively, they are a very formidable body.

His measures thus far, although considered as wild and extravagant by some of the old fashioned republicans, had met with no decided opposition by a majority of either house of Congress. But his estimates of the appropriations necessary for his department for the year 1820, startled those who had placed some reliance on his his prudence and talents for business. Even those who had believed all the accounts of the “great savings in the War Department,” now began to examine for themselves into his expenditures. The consequence of which was, that a majority of both houses of Congress concurred in the propriety of arresting the Secretary in his favorite,

but useless and extravagant scheme, of sending an army to the Yellow Stone River, fifteen hundred miles up the Missouri. They determined to check the recruiting service, which he was urging with as much ardour, as if a powerful enemy had invaded our shores, and was marching to Washington. And what was still more offensive, they adopted measures for reducing the army to six thousand men.

For these and similar offences, they have been stigmatized as Radicals, and denounced as enemies to the administration. The Secretary has made war upon them by every means in his power. A paper has been established at Washington, under his immediate patronage, to write them down. He has pursued them into the remotest parts of the Union; and South Carolina is not the first nor the last state, in which his vindictive hand has been seen and felt.

At the commencement of the year 1817, the army in the aggregate, amounted to 10,024.

There were recruited in that year 3,939

In the year 1818 4,238

In the year 1819 4,304

In three years, 12,481

At the close of the year 1819 the army amounted to 8,688

Less than the aggregate at the commencement of 1817 by } 1,336

This number added to the 12,481 amounts to 13,817 men lost to the army in three years. Of these probably about 3000 were discharged on the expiration of their terms of service; the remainder were lost by desertion and other casualties.

Mr. Calhoun required for the recruiting service of the year 1820 the sum of \$183,925

Viz—for 5,000 recruits—

Bounties at 12 Dollars each \$60,000

Premiums at 2 Dollars each 10,000

For quarters, fuel, bunks, citizen surgeons for examining the recruits and

attending the sick; fees for magistrates for qualifying recruits until organized for joining Regiments or Corps, at 22 78 1-2 per man 113,925 183,025

These estimates appear from a letter, from the Adjutant and Inspector General to the Secretary of War, and by him communicated to the Senate of the United States on the 20th of March 1820.

The House of Representatives paid but little attention to the Secretary's estimates and instructions. They voted to appropriate for the whole recruiting service of that year, no more than 855,125, not one third part of what the Secretary required. This appears from the first section of the bill making appropriations for the military service for 1820, and which passed into a law on the 14th of April of that year. So much of the section as respects this appropriation is in these words, "For bounties and premiums for *fifteen hundred recruits*, twenty-one thousand dollars. For fuel, straw, and all other expenses for recruits, until organized to join regiments and corps, thirty four thousand, one hundred and twenty five dollars."

On the 22nd of March, after this bill had passed the House of Representatives, and was depending before the Senate, the following letter from the Adjutant and Inspector General, was communicated to the Senate by the Secretary of War:—

"Adjutant & Inspector General's Office, }
March 11th, 1820. }

SIR—It appears by the newspapers, that the House of Representatives voted *only* 21,000 Dollars for bounties and premiums, on account of the recruiting service of the year. This sum will only enlist 1500 men; less than the number actually lost by desertion during the last year. In the three last years more than 12,000 men have been enlisted; and still the aggregate of the army at the close of the last year did not exceed 9,000 men.

It is true, only 300 men are entitled to a discharge by the expiration of their term; still if the desertions and other casualties, should be as great as in former years, the army will not exceed 8,000 men at the close of the year, including the recruits which may be obtained with 21,000 Dollars voted for that purpose.

I have the honor to be, Sir, your obedient servant,
"D. PARKER, Adj't. & Insp'r. Gen'l."

"The SECRETARY OF WAR."

This letter which the Secretary makes his own, by communicating it to the Senate, was evidently meant as

a severe reprimand upon the House of Representatives, for neglecting their duty; and an admonition to the Senate to attend to theirs, and amend the bill, so as to correspond, with the wishes and instructions of the War Department. It shews too, that the Secretary perfectly understood that the House of Representatives had determined to authorize the recruiting of 1500 men and no more for the year 1820.

The Senate on this point were as refractory as the House of Representatives, and notwithstanding the instructions and admonitions of the Secretary, and the utmost exertions of his friends, they passed the bill as it was sent to them. Congress had refused an appropriation for moving our troops from Council Bluffs to Yellow Stone, and were adopting measures for reducing our peace establishment. This was pressing very far upon the forbearance of the Secretary. But to limit the recruiting service, after the warning he had given, particularly to the Senate, was an evidence of marked disrespect, calculated to call forth all the energies of his character. Were his magnificent schemes to be defeated, his brilliant prospects to be obscured from the paltry consideration of saving a few thousand, or hundred thousand Dollars?

He bethought himself of all the great things that had been said of him in the public papers; He recollects, although it had not been formally announced, that "South Carolina had given to the nation, the ablest man that ever filled the War Department." He considered that it would be thought disgraceful in the army, that the greatest of all possible Secretaries, should yield to a parcel of Radicals in the two Houses of Congress. He reflected, that should this contumacy, particularly on the part of the Senate, be countenanced by the War Department, it would soon grow up into a spirit of mutiny, that it might be difficult to check.

Besides, some calculations alarmed the Secretary. If the army at the close of the year 1820, would amount to no more than 8000 men, including the 1,500, to be recruited by the authority of Congress, when in 1817, 1818 and 1819, there had been recruited 12,481 men, in four

years there would be a loss of sixteen thousand, including those discharged on the expiration of their term of service. It followed from this, that should the recruiting service be checked, the army in two years more would be reduced to a regiment, which would afford no apology for keeping in pay, nearly 700 commissioned officers; and might induce Congress to reduce the number of officers, which the Father of the Army ought in no wise to permit. And should any considerable portion of the officers of the army be dismissed, it might endanger the election of the army candidate, a calamity at all hazards to be avoided. Under such circumstances the Secretary did not long hesitate. He determined to recruit 1500 men by the authority of Congress, and 1711 by the authority of the War Department. Accordingly 3211 men were recruited for the service of the year 1820.

Whether Congress is to have any control over the recruiting service, or whether it is to depend upon the will of the Secretary of War, seems a question not yet settled. By the 8th section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States, Congress shall have power "to raise and support armies," under which they have presumed to regulate the recruiting service, both as to the amount of the appropriation, and as the number of men necessary for that service.

In the case of 1820, they were more explicit than usual; they expressly designated the number of men to be recruited. The words of the act are "for bounties and premiums for *fifteen hundred recruits*." In the act of the 29th of April 1816, the appropriation for the recruiting service is in these words: "For bounties and premiums, fifty-six thousand Dollars." In the act of the 3d of March 1817, "for bounties and premiums, thirty-two thousand dollars." In the act of the 19th February, 1818, "for bounties and premiums, forty-four thousand dollars." In the act of the 15th of February 1819, "for bounties and premiums, sixty-two thousand five hundred Dollars,"—without designating in any of these cases the number to be recruited. The number, however, was easily ascertained by calculation.

The unusual form of appropriation in this particular for the year 1820, was evidently meant as a limitation to the discretion previously exercised by the Secretary.— And this precaution was by no means unnecessary, for in the year 1817, there were recruited 3939 men, and in the year 1818, 4238; although Congress meant to provide for the recruiting of no more than 2500 in the former year, and 3000 in the latter. The Secretary authorized this excess of recruiting over the appropriations, probably under some usage of the War Department, by which he ventures to exceed the appropriations for any particular year, and fill up the ranks of the army as established by law, provided he can find unexpended balances that may be transferred to that service. And, it is possible, that in the last case of 1820, he thought himself, under the same principle, justified in disregarding the will of Congress, expressed in direct terms.

By the peace establishment of 1815, the army was fixed at 10,000 men; but whether the ranks were to be kept full at all times or not, depended on the will of Congress as they believed, and not upon that of the Secretary of War. If he had the right to recruit 1741 men in 1820, beyond the number for which Congress had made the appropriation, he would have had an equal right to recruit that number, even if Congress had made no appropriation whatever, for the recruiting service of that year.

The safety of the country requires that Congress should have the power of controlling the recruiting service. In this case it was peculiarly important, for they had determined to reduce the army, and it did reduce it in the year following.

If the Secretary of War could thus recruit men at his pleasure, against the will of Congress, and they were bound to appropriate for the pay, subsistence, and clothing of such recruits; and if he could make contracts to the amount of millions of Dollars, for fortifications and other objects connected with the defence of the country, and impose upon Congress the obligation, to make the appropriations necessary for carrying such contracts into effect,

then indeed, the Representatives of the People presented but a feeble barrier to the power of the War Department.

It is probable however, that Congress will find means hereafter, to restrain the recruiting service within proper bounds; and they have already, by an act of the first of May 1820, provided that no contract thereafter, shall be made by the heads of any of the departments "except under a law authorizing the same, or under an appropriation adequate to its fulfilment—and, excepting also, contracts made by the Quarter Master's Department, which may be made by the Secretaries of those Departments."

If the Secretary of War shall consider this very radical law as binding upon him, it will put an end to Rip Rap contracts.

As soon as it was discovered that more than 3000 men had been recruited for the year 1820, the House of Representatives, on motion of Mr. Tracey, called upon the Secretary for information upon this subject. In answer to which, on the 2nd of January 1821, he communicated the following letters and statements—

"Department of War, 30th Dec. 1820.

"SIR—In reply to the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 26th inst. requiring a statement from this Department, shewing the number of soldiers recruited for the Army, during the year 1820, *indicating the fund from which the expences of recruiting have been paid*, and whether any unexpended balance of former appropriations has been used, and in what year said appropriations was made: I enclose reports of the Adjutant and Inspector General, and the Second Auditor of the Treasury, shewing the number of recruits, and the expences of the recruiting service.

It is deemed proper to observe, that although the number of recruits exceed three thousand, the army has not been so much increased since the last year. The difference between the enlistments and the increase, is accounted for by the discharges, desertions, and other casualties, during the year, amounting to half as many as have been enlisted.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

J. C. CALHOUN.

Hon. J. W. TAYLOR, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

*Adjutant & Inspector General's Office, }
30th December, 1820. }*

SIR—In answer to that part of the Resolution of the House of Representatives, requiring the number of soldiers enlisted during this year, which you referred to me, I take the liberty to make the following extract, from my report to you of the 2nd inst. viz: "Abstract of the recruiting returns for 1820. whole number enlisted during the year, 3,211."

The number of recruits for this year is taken from the returns made to this office, of the first three-quarters, and an estimate for the present quarter.

I have the honor to be, with perfect respect, your obd't serv't.

D. PARKER, Adj't, & Insp. Gen'l.

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

**Treasury Department,
Second Auditor's Office, Dec. 28th 1820.**

SIR.—In compliance with the resolution of the House of Representatives, of the 26th inst. I have the honor to transmit to you, herewith, a statement of the funds out of which the expenses of recruiting for this year have been paid. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

WM. LEE.

Hon. J. C. CALHOUN. Secretary of War.

STATEMENT exhibiting the funds out of which the expenses of recruiting have been paid, during the year 1820 in obedience to a resolution of the House of Representatives, dated 26th December, 1820.

BOUNTIES AND PREMIUMS.

Balance unexpended in the hands of the Treasurer of the United States, on 1st. of Jan. 1820	3,197,92
Amount appropriated for the year 1820	21,000,00
Amount refunded to the Treasurer of the U.S. States by sundry persons during the year 1820	3,441,01
Amount brought to the credit of this appropriation on the books of this office, on settlement of accounts, being balances due thereon, by sundry persons, arising out of advances made in 1819, and 1820	26,917,54
Amount brought to the credit of this appropriation from the books of the 3d Auditor,	1,212
Amount due by Robert Brent, late paymaster general, being part of the advance made him on account of bounties and premiums, out of the appropriation for 1816, refunded in 1820, on settlement of his account	35,364,56
	\$91,133 03

EXPENSES OF RECRUITING.

Amount appropriated for the year 1820	34,125
Amount available by the Secretary of War for the recruiting service of the year 1820,	\$125,258 03

EXPENDITURES.

Amount of warrants issued by the Secretary of War to the 26th of December, applicable to bounties and premiums	38,610 17
Amount disbursed by sundry persons applicable to bounties and premiums, and brought to the debit of that appropriation or settlement of their	

accounts, their being balances due by them to that amount of sundry specific appropriations.	9,030 41
Amount disbursed to 26th of December, on account of expenses of recruiting	18,749 65
Amount expended deducted	66,390 22
Leaving a balance of appropriations on the 26th of December 1820, of	\$58,867 80
Under the following heads, viz—	
Bounties and Premiums	43,492 45
Expenses of Recruiting	15,475 35
	\$58,868 80

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, Second Auditor's Office, 28th Dec. 1820.

WILLIAM LEE.

Note.—When we say Robert Brent, late Paymaster General, refunded in 1820 \$35,364.56, it ought not to be understood that he refunded that sum in money; he refunded it in tellerents of account only; that is to say, a balance being due to him, for disbursements on account of subsistence, and being a debtor under the head of bounties and premiums, to a large amount; his account of subsistence was closed; by carrying a part of the balance, due by him on bounties and premiums, say \$35,364.56, to his debit on that of subsistence, by which transaction, bounties and premiums received a credit on our books, while subsistence was debited."

This statement, which the Secretary communicated to the House of Representatives by way of throwing light upon a subject of enquiry, is a most rare and singular Document. The Radicals were about as wise after this elucidation as they were before it, as the Secretary, no doubt, intended they should be. But a paper of this character, thus communicated to Congress, deserves a little more attention than it has received. As to the balance of \$58,867 80 remaining on the 26th of December, 1820, nearly the whole of it would be expended when all the expenses of the recruiting service of that year should be paid. The bounties, premiums, and other expenses of recruiting 3,211 men, would amount according to the estimate furnished by the War Department, to \$118,146 68. The amount available by the Secretary of War for this service, as by Mr. Lee's statement, was \$125,358 03,—leaving a surplus of no more than \$7,141 40.

The funds out of which bounties and premiums were paid for 1820, consist of six items. The first an unexpended balance in the hands of the Treasurer of \$3,197 92. This balance is not mentioned in the Secretary's estimate, in which he asks \$183,925 for recruiting 5000 men. Congress did not take it into consideration,

or they would have appropriated a certain sum in addition to this balance, to recruit 1,500 men. The second is the sum of 21,000 dollars appropriated, and all that Congress intended should be expended, for bounties and premiums for the year 1820. As to the third, fourth, and fifth items, the Secretary could not suppose that any body should understand them. He might as well have informed Congress that 80,000 dollars and upwards had been refunded to the Treasurer, and received from certain persons, at sundry times, and in divers manners. As to the sixth item of \$35,364 56, refunded by Robert Brent, it must have surprised those who knew that Mr. Brent died in September, 1819, utterly insolvent, and a defaulter to the Government to a very large amount.

By a letter of the Comptroller of the Treasury of the 27th of November, 1820, it appears that a balance was due to the United States, from Robert Brent, late Paymaster General, on the books of the Third Auditor, of \$40,914 18. Besides which there were other and much larger sums due from him to the United States; for, by a report of the Comptroller of the Treasury of the 27th December, 1822, it appears that he was a delinquent to the amount of \$145,598 38, accruing out of advances made to him from the 18th of May, 1816, to June, 1819, reported for suit on the 4th of May, 1820.

As the sixth item was involved in some obscurity, Mr. Lee adds an explanatory note, which Mr. Calhoun must have taken for a satisfactory elucidation of the subject, or he would not have made it a part of his Report. I have examined this explanatory note over and over, and never read any thing more ingeniously perplexed. Who would suppose that the magic force of a few entries in the books of the Second Auditor, by which not a cent was obtained from Mr. Brent, and which was not to diminish the general balance against him to the amount of a cent, could authorize the Secretary of War, or any other person, to draw \$35,364 56 from any fund belonging to the United States?

Robert Brent had expended more money upon the article of subsistence than had been put into his hands

for that particular purpose, which he took from monies put into his hands to pay bounties and premiums;—upon both items of account, however, there was a large balance due from him to the United States. It is easy to understand how his subsistence account was balanced by charging it with \$35,364 56 which he had taken from the monies in his hands to pay bounties and premiums, and that the balance on his account of bounties and premiums should be diminished by that amount. This might be a convenient mode of ascertaining the final balance due from him on both accounts, but could be of no other importance to him or to the United States, as they were to receive no money from him on either account, and surely were not expected to pay any. But whence came the money? Robert Brent refunded in “settlement of account only.” This is not money: Yet the money was obtained from some quarter, for bounties and premiums cannot be paid in “settlement of account only.”

If this sum of \$35,364 56, said to be refunded by Robert Brent, but which never was and never will be refunded, was drawn from the treasurer of the United States, as agent for the War Department, or from the treasury or any other fund belonging to the United States, after being charged to Robert Brent as if actually paid to him on account of his advances for subsistence, and credited to him as if actually refunded on account of an unexpended balance of money placed in his hands to pay bounties and premiums, and then applied to the recruiting service of the year 1820; if all this was done with Robert Brent, while he was in his grave and knew nothing of the matter, it proves, at least, that the Secretary is very expert at raising the wind.

In June, 1820, Robert Brent was indebted to the United States in the sum of \$115,598 88. He was dead, and his estate utterly insolvent; and this money never has been, and never will be, refunded. An attempt to draw money from such a fund, thus sunk in the bottomless pit of the Paymaster's pocket, would formerly have been deemed as hopeless as the attempt of the philosopher of Laputa to extract sun beams from

cucumbers: But this is an age of improvemens, and every thing yields to the powers of genius.

It was discovered that Mr. Brent had disbursed \$35,364 56 for subsistence over and above what was charged to him on that account. It was thought that this sum might be paid to him on the part of the United States to balance and close this account of subsistence, provided he should immediately refund the same, on account of a very large balance due from him on account of bounties and premiums. But, as this payment and re-payment would have been but mere matters of form, it was discovered that it might be dispensed with, by a few entries on the books of the Second Auditor. Mr. Brent was, therefore, charged with this sum to close his subsistence account, and credited with an equal sum on account of bounties and premiums; by which *transaction*, says the Second Auditor, (he ought to have said *manœuvre*) "bounties and premiums received a credit on our books, while subsistence was debited;" and the credit thus obtained was considered as a part of the available funds, which were applied to the recruiting service of 1820 under warrants drawn by the Secretary of War, as if the same had been appropriated by Congress for the recruiting service of that year.

Yet the money placed in the hands of Mr. Brent in 1816 for paying bounties and premiums for that year was not considered by Mr. Calhoun as a part of the available funds from which bounties and premiums could be paid in 1818; for, in his letter of the 18th of December, 1817, to the Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, he says, "The appropriation for bounties and premiums for the year 1817 was made on a supposition that twenty-five hundred men would be recruited within the year; but as more than three thousand men will have been recruited within that period, the appropriation will necessarily be deficient; and as the discharges from the Army in 1818 will probably be equal to those in 1817, and a correspondent number of recruits will therefore be required, it may be proper to increase this appropriation for the year 1818, and make it 44,000 dollars instead of 32,000, as stated

in the general estimate." Had the money in the hands of Mr. Breit been considered as within the reach of Mr. Calhoun for the payment of bounties and premiums in 1818, this increase of appropriation would not have been asked for by him, nor granted by Congress if it had been asked for. At this time, however, Mr. Calhoun has not made his wonderful discovery of *refunding in settlement of account only*.

Much has been effected by the magic pen of the Second Auditor; but something remains yet to be done. More entries must be made upon his books. From his statement it appears that no more than \$4,125 dollars were in the hands of the Secretary of War applicable to the expenses of recruiting, (exclusive of bounties and premiums) as for quarters, fuel, straw, bunks, &c. This was the sum appropriated by Congress for these expenses for 1,500 recruits, and would answer for no more. 3,211 recruits, therefore, must have remained without fuel, straw, bunks, &c. if a part of the surplus available for bounties and premiums, say \$39,037 63 1-2, had not been carried to the aid of this appropriation, which must have been done, although we cannot discover by what authority, as the appropriations for bounties and premiums, and the appropriations for the other expenses of recruiting, were made under distinct heads, and the accounts under them so kept, as appears by the Auditor's statements.

According to the Auditor's statement, there was in the hands of the Secretary of War, for the payment of bounties and premiums, \$91,133 02:—deduct from this bounties and premiums for 3,211 recruits, at \$14 each, \$44,951—and a surplus is left of \$46,179 03.

The sum necessary for the expenses of recruiting 3,211 men, for quarters, fuel, straw, bunks, &c. at \$28 78 $\frac{1}{4}$ each, amounts to \$73,162 63. The sum applicable to this expense, as by the Auditor's statement, is \$34,125, showing a deficit of \$39,037 63, which must have been taken from the surplus above stated, and would still leave a balance of that surplus of \$7,141 40.

When these entries shall be duly made, we may post.

sibly have another report, that the account of expenses for fuel, straw, bunks, &c. for 1820 is closed by charging it with a part of the surplus on the account of bounties and premiums, say \$39,020 58, and crediting bounties and premiums with an equal amount, by which *transaction* (as the Auditor would say) bounties and premiums will receive a credit on his books, while fuel, straw, and bunks will be debited. And this sum, thus credited, may again be considered as available funds in the hands of the Secretary of War, for the payment of bounties and premiums.

It is not easy to fix a limit to the effects of this newly discovered principle of refunding in settlement of account only. It will, unless checked by Congress, give an impetus to the operations our Departments, such as was given to our Banks by the suspension of specie payments.

The House of Representatives had called for information as to the number of men recruited in 1820, and *as to the fund from which the expenses of recruiting had been paid*. Mr. Lee, in his explanatory note, should have expressed, in direct terms, the fund from which the \$35,364 65 was obtained, and not have left the Radicals to conjecture that it came from the dead.

One object of the House, in calling upon the Secretary for this information, evidently was to ascertain how far, in applying this money, he had conformed to the laws regulating the Treasury, War, and Navy Departments. But if information more explicit could not be obtained, it was in vain to pursue the inquiry.

As the most effectual means of reducing the expense of the recruiting service, and other enormous expenses of the Army, Congress resolved to reduce the Army itself. While the recruiting service in 1820 was pressed by the Secretary on the one hand; on the other, he was digesting a plan, in obedience to a resolution of the House of Representatives, for reducing the Army to 6000 men. And the Secretary of the Treasury was borrowing three millions of dollars, to meet the immediate exigencies of our Government.

When the Army was reduced in 1821, Congress were obliged to make the following appropriation: "for three months gratuitous pay for disbanded officers and soldiers, including travelling allowances for the same, sixty thousand dollars."

As the reduction of the Army fell almost exclusively upon the rank and file, few officers received any part of this appropriation: and, if no more men had been recruited in the preceding four years, than Congress intended, a very small portion of this appropriation would have been wanted.

The contests between the Secretary of War, and the two Houses of Congress, have been frequent and arduous; he struggling to draw money, money, more money from the Treasury, for the use of his Department, and they to retain it for other purposes. If, in all this, the Secretary has been right and Congress wrong, then indeed, must it be considered as unfortunate, that they did not, in the year 1820, borrow six millions of dollars instead of three, and in the year 1821, ten millions instead of five. Then our peace establishment might have been kept up at ten thousand men; our army removed a thousand miles further into the wilderness, from Council Bluffs to Yellow Stone river: Then we might have recruited five thousand men every year; and every year have expended two or three hundred thousand dollars upon Rip Rap contracts.

CASSIUS.

1. The first step in the process of *in vitro* selection of a cell line is to obtain a cell line that is relatively homogeneous. This is done by using a technique called "cloning". Cloning is a process of dividing a cell into two or more cells, each of which is capable of growing and dividing independently. This results in a population of cells that are all identical to each other. This population of cells is then used for further selection.

2. The second step in the process of *in vitro* selection of a cell line is to identify the specific characteristics of the cell line that are desired. This is done by using a technique called "screening". Screening is a process of testing a population of cells to determine which cells have the desired characteristics. This results in a population of cells that are all similar to each other in terms of the desired characteristics.

3. The third step in the process of *in vitro* selection of a cell line is to select the cells that have the desired characteristics. This is done by using a technique called "selection". Selection is a process of identifying the cells that have the desired characteristics and then removing the other cells. This results in a population of cells that are all similar to each other in terms of the desired characteristics.

4. The fourth step in the process of *in vitro* selection of a cell line is to culture the selected cells. This is done by using a technique called "culture". Culture is a process of growing the selected cells in a controlled environment. This results in a population of cells that are all similar to each other in terms of the desired characteristics.

5. The fifth step in the process of *in vitro* selection of a cell line is to test the selected cells for their ability to produce the desired product. This is done by using a technique called "testing". Testing is a process of determining whether the selected cells are able to produce the desired product. This results in a population of cells that are all similar to each other in terms of their ability to produce the desired product.

6. The sixth step in the process of *in vitro* selection of a cell line is to repeat the process of cloning, screening, selection, culture, and testing until a cell line is obtained that is capable of producing the desired product in a consistent and reliable manner. This results in a cell line that is suitable for use in a pharmaceutical or biotechnology application.

7. The final step in the process of *in vitro* selection of a cell line is to freeze the cell line for future use.

NO. III.

“ECONOMY—MR. CALHOUN.”

“*Great savings in the War Department.*”

COLUMBIA TELESCOPE.

That a Secretary of War should become popular with the officers of the Army, by observing a strict system of economy, in his Department, is what never did happen and never will. But to be popular with the army, and at the same time gain a reputation for economy, Mr. Calhoun has thought possible, for he has made the attempt. And, if he can prostrate those members of Congress, who have opposed his measures, and whom he and his friends are pleased to call *Radicals*, he may possibly succeed. Hence the war, which he and his corps of editors have made upon those members; a war which they press with unremitting zeal and fury.

The members thus denominated *Radicals* very conscientiously believe that Mr. Calhoun has been more extravagant in the expenditure of public money, than any other Secretary of War has been in time of peace, from the commencement of our Government; and that their duty to their constituents bound them to oppose many of the appropriations which he required. And as my own conviction is, that they were perfectly right, I feel disposed to make for them, such an apology as facts and circumstances will warrant.

The epithet *Radical*, has been applied to a large portion of the republican members of both houses of Congress, by the Secretary and his friends, as a term of reproach; very much as the terms *Democrat*, *Jocobin*, and *Disorganizers* were applied to members of Congress of the same principles, by the *Friends of Order and good Government*, under the administration of Mr. Adams.

The meaning of the word Radical, in its common acceptation implies nothing of reproach; but it has an acquired and an imported meaning, extremely odious in the view of those who use it.

A part of the subjects of the British Government have been stigmatized with the name of Radicals, who are advocates for a Radical reform in parliament, a radical reform in the hierarchy, a radical reform in the standing Army, and a radical correction of a great variety of abuses, by which the laboring poor of that country are reduced to a condition more wretched than that of slaves; and who are bowed down to the earth without remedy and without hope, by the laws of the Holy Alliance and the terrors of military despotism.

The party thus denominated Radicals, are extremely odious to the nobility, dignified clergy, titled gentry and officers of the army in that country, and by a common feeling, with the tories and aristocrats in this.— But no American, who harbours in his bosom one spark of genuine republicanism, but sympathizes with those unhappy people, who are struggling for a small portion of that liberty which we enjoy; who is not indignant at the recitals which we have heard of murders committed, by the authority of government, on unarmed people, peaceably assembled to make known their sufferings to their King—cut down by the sword, and trodden under the hoofs of the horses of a haughty and triumphant military. The Radicals of that country do not wish to abolish the monarchy nor alter their form of government. Their views are much more moderate than were those of Hampden and Sidney. They are much more oppressed than we were in '76, and yet no act of theirs is so radical as to bear the slightest comparison with our Declaration of Independence. Still there are some in this country who look with a malignant eye upon their struggles, and who execrate their principles.

But what have the Members of Congress called Radicals done to merit reproach? They have endeavored to revive Mr. Jefferson's old system of economy, which has long been stigmatized by Mr. Calhoun's

riends as *penny wise and pound foolish*, and exploded accordingly—they have opposed several of the appropriations required for the army and fortifications, because they appeared unnecessary, and must, if granted lead to an immediate resort to loans or taxes—they have passed several acts to limit the powers of the War Department, to prevent improper transfers of appropriations, to restrain the power of making contracts, or purchasing land for the United States without the assent of Congress—they have passed laws to enforce a faithful performance of duty on the part of the receiving and disbursing officers of the government, by obliging them to settle up their accounts once at least in four years, under the penalty of loosing their offices—they have adopted rigid rules to compel the collection of old balances due to the government—they have pursued public defaulters by a great variety of necessary but vexatious enquiries and investigations—and they have stopped the pay of such defaulters as remained in office until their arrears shall be accounted for and paid into the treasury, by a proviso to the appropriation laws of 1822 and 23.

It may be thought strange that such a provision, by law, should be necessary at this time. Nothing can be more just than that money due from a defaulting officer should be retained out of his pay in discharge of his debt. Under the administration of Mr. Jefferson it was the practice to retain the pay of officers thus in arrears; and they were happy to be continued in office under such conditions.

It is the duty of the Comptrollers of the Treasury “to take all such measures as may be authorized by the laws to enforce the payment of all debts due to the United States.” It was, therefore, their duty to retain, as far as they had the power, the pay and emoluments of such defaulting officers in discharge of their debts to the United States. In addition to which the General Regulations of the Army required that the pay of such officers should be stopped, and this was done as late as the 20th of No-

vember, 1821, as will appear by the following letter of the Second Auditor:

" TREASURY DEPARTMENT,
2nd Auditor's Office, Nov. 20. 1821. }

SIR—Lieutenant _____ of the 2nd Artillery was included in the Comptroller of the Treasury's report to Congress, in 1820, as having failed within the year, to make a settlement of his accounts; and, I therefore consider it my duty, under the 26th section of the 79th article of the general regulations of the Army, to request, that measures may be taken to stop from his pay and emoluments the sum of \$76, now due by him on the books of this office. With great respect, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM LEE.

D. PARKER, Pay Master General."

This regulation was calculated to save much money to our treasury, but was excessively annoying to the officers; insomuch that the Father of the Army thought himself called upon to interfere in their behalf, which he did very effectuellerly, for a time at least, by the following order:

" DEPARTMENT OF WAR, Dec. 3d, 1821.

SIR—The practice of instructing Paymasters, to withhold from officers of the Army all such sums as may be reported by the Second and Third Auditors to be due from them to the United States, is *superseded*.

I have the honor, &c. J. C. CALHOUN.

The PAYMASTER GENERAL."

This order was an important point gained by these officers for the time, and would have continued to be so, but for the interference of the Radicals, who counteracted the effects of this instance of the Secretary's paternal feelings by the following proviso to the Military Appropriation Bill of the 7th of May, 1822.—

"That no money appropriated by this act, or the act entitled An act making appropriations for the military service of the United States for the year one thousand eight hundred and twenty-two, shall be advanced or paid to any person on any contract, or to any officer who is in arrears to the United States, until he shall have accounted for, and paid into the Treasury, all sums for which he may be liable." The principle of this proviso was adopted in the Navy Appropriation Bill of that year, as well as the Appropriation Bills of 1823, and will continue to be adopted hereafter, unless the same shall be *superseded* by Mr. Calhoun.

The partiality discovered on this, as well as on other occasions, by the Secretary towards defaulters, has

drawn nearly the whole corps to aid his cause, and they now form a very considerable part of his strength.

Under the principle of the above proviso, many thousand dollars may be annually saved to the treasury. But the Radicals are to have no credit for all this;—the whole will be given to Mr. Calhoun, and considered among the “great savings in the War Department;” and quite as fairly so as nine-tenths of the great savings which are attributed to his superior economy. But more of this hereafter.

What important institutions have the Radicals attempted to destroy? The Navy is their favorite means of national defence, which they are willing to increase as fast as the resources and circumstances of the country will admit or require. On this point, however, there seems to be but one opinion in Congress.

Nine-tenths of the Members of Congress cherish the Military Academy at West Point as an institution which does honor to the nation. It is true a few gentlemen from the West have shewn some opposition to this establishment, chiefly, it is believed, on account of its location; and it is not to be denied that, on that ground, those gentlemen have some cause of complaint.

As to the Indian Department, it was established and long supported from motives of humanity; but for some years past it had become so expensive, so useless, so corrupt, and so totally inadequate to the purposes for which it was instituted, that gentlemen of all parties concurred in a wish to change the system. A law for that purpose has been passed by the constituted authorities, and no doubt will receive the sanction of the nation.

But the Secretary of War wanted money, money, *beau coup de l'argent*; and a refusal to grant it, constitutes the chief crime of the Radicals. The refusal, especially, to grant him \$183,925, to enable him to recruit 5,000 men for the service of the year 1820, is never to be forgiven, as it led him into a labyrinth of difficulties.—But although those members who voted against this appropriation will never be forgiven by the Secretary, it

is possible they may be by their constituents, when the circumstances of the case shall be known.

At the commencement of the year 1817 the stand-	
ing amounted to	10,024 men
In the years 1817, '18, and '19, there were re-	
cruted	12,481
	22,508
At the close of the year 1819 the army amounted to	8,688

Exhibiting a loss in three years of 13,817

Of these probably 3,000 were discharged on the expiration of their term of service. The residue, amounting to 10,817 men, were lost by desertion, drowning, shooting, and other casualties. The expense of recruiting the number thus lost would amount,

In bounties and premiums, at \$14 each, to	\$157,438 00
In other expenses of recruiting, as for quar-	
ters, fuel, straw, bunks, &c. for the	
recruits, at \$21.78 $\frac{1}{2}$ each, to	246,465 29

Whole expense of recruiting 397,903 29
 Upon a calculation that these recruits served on year upon an average before they deserted or were otherwise lost to the service, their pay, subsistence, clothing, medicine, &c. at \$250 each, would amount to 2,704,250 00

Making in all 3,102,953 29 expended without producing the least beneficial result to the country.

Calculations like these alarmed a majority of both Houses of Congress, who feared to waste the public treasure, and who dreaded a resort to loans or taxes in time of peace. They believed that the most culpable mismanagement existed, either in the administration of the War Department or among the officers of the Army. They believed that an army in which it was necessary to recruit nearly half their number every year, could be of no service to the country in war or peace. And they believed that an army composed of such perishable materials ought to be reduced and not increased. At such a time, and under such circumstances, did the Secretary of War ask an appropriation for recruiting 5,000 men.

Whatever Congress might owe to the official station of the Secretary, they owed more to themselves and

to their constituents. They considered it a dereliction of their duty to grant the full amount of this appropriation. Had they authorized the recruiting of 5,000 men by granting \$183,925 for that purpose, they would have been bound to make much greater appropriations for the pay, subsistence, and clothing of these recruits; for a year or two at least, until they should have time to desert.

Congress determined very properly to authorize the recruiting of no more than 1,500 men; but the Secretary determined to recruit more than twice that number. In doing this he discovered great devotion to the wishes of the Army, but very little to the will of Congress or the interest of the country.

The facts already stated are certainly sufficient to justify Congress in refusing to grant the full appropriation for recruiting five thousand men. Yet there were other circumstances which had great weight in bringing them to this decision, as well as to the determination to reduce the Army. They had heard reports of gross abuses practised by the officers of the Army in the expenditure of the public money, and in the destruction of public property; and they had heard accounts of cruel punishments, such as flogging, cropping, branding, drowning, and shooting, inflicted upon the soldiers by the officers, in direct violation of the laws of the United States. Whoever will be at the trouble of reading the trial of Col. William King before a General Court Martial, in December, 1819, and his printed letter to the President of the United States, will find abundant reasons for such reports. This trial, laid before the House of Representatives at their request, on the 3d day of May, 1820, may be found among the printed documents of Congress. The most material circumstances of the trial, however, were known at Washington some months earlier.

At present I shall notice no more of this trial than respects the illegal punishments and excessive cruelties inflicted upon the soldiers of the Army.

Col. King was convicted on several charges and specifications, and, among others, on the following:

"That he did sanction the proceedings of a general court martial in the case of Newley, a private in the 4th infantry, who was found guilty of desertion, and sentenced to have his head shaved, his left ear to be cut from his head, to receive fifty lashes, and then to be drummed out of the service; and did approve of the said sentence, but was pleased to remit all the punishment except fifty lashes."

"Of failing and refusing (although thereunto requested) to investigate the cause and manner of the death of Charles Mason, a private in the 4th regiment of United States infantry, who was inhumanly drowned in the harbor of Pensacola, while undergoing a ducking, which was carried to such excess, as to deprive him of life, and was inflicted by order of Lieut. Lear, and executed by Sergeant Stark, without the form or authority of a court martial, and entirely on his own responsibility; and, although Major Dinkins, then commanding in Pensacola, immediately arrested said Lieutenant and Sergeant until the return of the said Col. King from Montpelier; yet, nevertheless, the said Col. King, totally failing, refusing, and neglecting to do his duty, had them both released, without any trial or legal investigation."

"That the said Col. King being then commanding officer of the province of West Florida, did fail, refuse and neglect to cause an immediate inquiry into the circumstances attending the death of Neil Cameron, a deserter from the 4th regiment of United States Infantry, who was in the most inhuman and cruel manner put to death by Sergeant Childress, although said Cameron made no resistance, but begged to be taken back, and tried for his offence, by a general Court Martial."

"That the said Col. King did, on or about the 1st day of March, 1819, order Lieut. A. M. Houston, acting assistant deputy quarter master general, to pay Sergeant Childress, of the 4th regiment of United States Infantry, the sum of thirty dollars, which he alleges was for the apprehension and delivery of Neil Cameron, a private of the first battalion company, 4th regiment infantry; when, in fact, said Sergeant Childress had put the said Cameron, to death, on or about the 16th day of September, 1818, in the woods about 16 or 17 miles from Pensacola; and never had delivered him to any officer of the United States army, as the regulations required, but left him unburied where he had shot him—all of which circumstances the said Col. King was well apprised."

Thomas Mitchell, a private in the 4th infantry, a witness on the part of the prosecution, testified "that he was sent with Charles Mason in the morning, to see that he washed himself; he had been in the stocks all night; and while he was down washing himself, Sergeant Starks and another man came down with a rope; the Sergeant ordered us to tie Mason's hands and feet: we only tied his hands and kept him under water 'till we cried out to Sergeant Starks to let him take breath; he replied 'keep him under the water, if you don't; I will come in and duck you.' Afterwards witness told him he was so near drowned, it was not worth while ducking him any more, and he was ordered to fetch him out then; when we were fetching him out, we both had hold of him, and the Sergeant ordered us to let him go. He fell and sunk under water, and we grabbed him as soon as we could, and we took him out and rolled him on a barrel awhile, but he was dead." Question by the Court—"Was he dead when you let him go, or did you observe any life in him?" Answer—"He was not dead when we let him go."

Cornelius Jackson, a private in the 4th regiment, United States infantry, testified, "that he was one of the party who was sent in pursuit of Neil Cameron, private, of the 4th infantry; that the party came upon him about 15 miles from Pensacola, while he was asleep; does not know who gave the order. Our order was wrote by Major Dinkins, which was, if we came up with him in the bounds of Spain, we were to put him to instant death, but if he was

out of the limits of Spain, we were to take him back as prisoner. we waked him up and asked him if he had not deserted, and he said he had; we asked him if he did not consider himself a prisoner, and he said he did. Sergeant Childress told him that he had orders to put him to instant death; he begged to be taken back as a prisoner (saying he was on his return to Pensacola) and tried by a court martial, and receive such punishment as a court might put on him Sergeant Childress said it was not worth while, for if he was, he would be put to death as soon as he got back. Cameron said, if he was, it would give him a few days to repent of his drunkenness and bad doings.— Witness saw Sergeant Childress' determination was to shoot him, and witness told Sergeant Childress to let Cameron read the order himself, and he still begged to be taken back as a prisoner;—then Sergeant Childress ordered witness to shoot him, and witness could not do it;—he did not see any occasion for it, for Cameron had given himself up as a prisoner. Childress took the gun out of witness' hand and stepped round him, while he was sitting down, and snapped it at Cameron's breast twice. Sergeant Childress handed back the gun and told witness to discharge it; he told witness to load her again, and witness done so. Cameron then made this reply to him; 'Sergeant Childress you have snapped your gun at me a second time, now take me home as a prisoner if you please.' He told him it was more than he could do, for his order would not allow of it; Sergeant Childress stepped round to Cameron as he was sitting down, and says I wish I had a heart as big a mill stone, and blew him through;—then we returned to Pensacola as quick as we could; we reported to the commanding officer what we had done, and he said we had done exactly right."

Question by the prosecutor—"Did you bury him or leave him where you had shot him; and did Col. King pass you on the road as you were returning, and had he any conversation with the Sergeant or yourself on the subject of shooting Cameron?"

Answer—"We left him where we shot him, unburied; Col. King did not pass us on our return."

Question by the prosecutor—"Did you not receive in March last at this post, fifteen dollars from Sergeant Childress, as part of the reward for apprehending Neil Cameron?" Answer—"I did."

Col. King did not seem to consider his conduct as even censurable. In his defence he says:

"There is not, Mr. President, in the United States, a camp, a garrison or a corps, in which corporal punishment, by stripes or lashes, has not been necessarily resorted to since 1812. I defy my accuser to produce an orderly book of the army, that does not bear the record of sentences similar to those I sanctioned. Every General in service well knows, that lashes are daily inflicted throughout the army. Why if it is improper has it never been forbidden? Because the law does not prohibit it." "In October 1818, Genl. Gaines my commanding officer, approved the sentence of a general court martial, which awarded to a deserter the penalty of being *branded on both cheeks and the forehead with the letter D.* I hold in my hand, Sir, that officers approval of a sentence, which directs that an *offender's ears shall be cut off as close to his head as possible.* What law, Mr. President, authorizes such punishment? None, What law prohibits it? None. Then, sir, those cases are precisely on the same footing, except that the punishment which sanctioned, is usual and customary, whereas the other is unusual and severe."

This convenient rule for construing the laws of the United States was not peculiar to Col. King. It is to be hoped, however, it did not prevail to the extent he represents. By the 7th section of an act of Congress of the 16th May, 1812, so much of the act for establishing rules and articles for the government of the Armies of the

United States as authorizes the infliction of corporal punishment by stripes and lashes, was repealed. The officers had no authority to inflict such punishment by statute. It is probable, however, they exercised this power under some unwritten common law of the Army. The meaning of the 7th section of the act of 1812 could not have been misunderstood by a single officer of the Army. But the will of Congress seems to have but little weight with any part of our Military Establishment, from the Head of the War Department to the lowest commissioned officer.

Col. King, in his letter to the President of the United States, attempts to justify the act of putting Neil Cameron to death, and admits that he did, "*in several instances, give orders to put deserters to death on the spot, if overtaken in the province of Florida.*" And adds:

"Even the Government, to whom my order was early reported, *by a busy meddler*, appears to have viewed my conduct with no evil eye, until it was goaded on to the measure of an arrest, by the outcry of newspaper scribblers, and the threats, if I am correctly informed of two *factional demagogues* in Congress; else why after demanding from me a report on the subject, in March 1819, was the business permitted to slumber until the August following, more than thirteen months after the order was given."

These *Factional Demagogues*, no doubt, were *Radicals*, who, in the opinion of Col. King, were disturbing the wholesome discipline of the Army.

As to the charge of having ordered thirty dollars to be paid to Sergeant Childress, he exclaims—

"In the name of Heaven, wherein consists the guilt of this transaction? Under the regulations of the Department of War, thirty dollars is the reward paid for the apprehension and delivery of a deserter. The party sent in pursuit of Cameron were ordered to put him to death—they fulfilled the order, and were as justly entitled to the reward, as if they had, under ordinary circumstances, delivered him. The propriety of the order has nothing to do with the payment of the reward; and to have withheld the thirty dollars, would have been punish the Sergeant for the faithful performance of his duty."

Col. King was mistaken as to the light in which his conduct was viewed by the government; for, although it is true that the House of Representatives pressed upon the War Department the necessity of ascertaining the truth of reports which had reached them of abuses in the army, it is but justice to the Secretary to state, that, as soon as he had authentic information that an order had been issued by Col. King to shoot deserters, he did, in March, 1819, direct an enquiry into the fact, and, in the August following, ordered a Court Martial, before which

Col. King was tried, convicted, and sentenced to be suspended, from all rank, pay, and emoluments, for five years. But it is not known that any others have been punished for these offences. Although the orders to shoot deserters wherever found in the province of West Florida were frequent, yet it does not appear that any one was actually obeyed except in the case of Neil Cameron; but this furnishes no excuse for the officers who gave the orders.

On the 8th of June, 1820, the President of the United States, in compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives, laid before them a report of executions which had been inflicted in the Army since the year 1815, in which we find many cases of illegal and cruel punishments.

These facts, which the public ought to know, shew how rapidly abuses grow up in an Army, and how important it is, upon every principle of humanity as well as economy, that our peace establishment should be upon as small a footing as a regard for the safety of the country will admit. Such was the policy of Jefferson—such ought to be the policy of the nation—such is the policy of the party in Congress who are denounced as Radicals.

And shall the members thus denounced, who, with all this information, and much more of the same kind, before them, voted against recruiting 5,000 men in 1820, and in favor of reducing the Army to 6,000 in 1821—shall these men be condemned by their constituents as the destroyers of useful establishments—and yet, for these, with other offences of a like character, they are pursued and persecuted by the Secretary of War and his hireling editors.

As early as the 17th of April, 1818, the Secretary was called upon by a resolution of the House of Representatives, offered by Mr. Trimble, of Kentucky, to report whether any, and, if any, what, reduction might be made in the Military Peace Establishment of the United States, *with safety to the public service*. In answer to which he made his report of the 11th of December, 1818, in which he gives it as his opinion that

"A reduction of the expense of the present establishment; cannot be made *with safety to the public service, by reducing the army.*" And "that the expence of our military establishment cannot be materially reduced *without injury to the public service, by reducing the pay and emoluments of the officers and soldiers.*"

An effort was made, however, to reduce the Army in the session of 1818 and '19, which was successfully resisted by the Secretary, in part by the official weight of his character, but much more by his address, and that of his friends, in producing an impression that the President of the United States was opposed to any reduction.

In 1820 the Secretary was directed to report, at the next session, a plan for reducing the army to 6,000 men, by a resolution offered by Mr. Clay. Kentucky seems to be the head quarters of Radicalism.

In 1821 the Army was reduced from 10,000 to 6,000 men, although the ten thousand were as much wanted then as they were in 1818.

The reduction in numbers was two-fifths, but the expense of the Army was not diminished in the same proportion, because the reduction fell chiefly on the rank and file, while nearly all the officers—the most expensive part—remained in service. The reduction of expense, however, must exceed half a million of dollars a year.

It seems, after all, that the President was not opposed to the reduction; for, in his Message of the 3d December, 1822, he says:

"The organization of the several corps, composing the army, is such as to admit its expansion to a great extent, in case of emergency, the officers carrying with them all the light which they possess, to the new corps to which they might be appointed. With the organization of the staff *there is equal cause to be satisfied.*"

If the Secretary was right in his report in 1818, that the Army could not be reduced *with safety to the public service*, then Congress have been guilty of an offence against him and against the nation. But if the reduction has been made *without danger to the public service*, then has the Secretary much to answer for at the bar of the public.

CASSIUS.

NO. IV.

“ECONOMY—MR. CALHOUN.”

“Great savings in the War Department.”

COLUMBIA TELESCOPE.

Whatever may be said of the conduct of Mr. Calhoun's friends, their courage will not be called in question.

To pass off upon the American people the most magnificent, the most visionary, and the most extravagant Secretary of War we have ever had, as a model of prudence and economy, required a bold defiance of public opinion, of which our history happily affords but few examples.

As the Secretary's economy is the weakest part of his character, his friends, with military skill, have turned the whole of their artillery to the defence of this point.

Every thing that has had a tendency to reduce the expenses of the Army, has been ascribed to the superior management of Mr. Calhoun. All the retrenchments introduced by the Radical members of Congress, have been attributed to his economy. The money saved by the reduction of the Army, which he obstinately opposed, is carried to his credit. Whatever we have gained by favorable seasons, abundant crops, and the reduced price of provisions, is claimed as the work of this economical Secretary; and should it rain manna in the wilderness, which may be wanted for the support of our forces there, it will be considered as so much gained by him on account of subsistence, and recorded among his “great savings in the War Department.”

No small part of the Secretary's great savings has been attributed to the establishment of the Commissariat system in 1818. Whatever merit there may be in the estab-

lishment of that system, it is due almost exclusively to Col. Williams, late a very able and patriotic Senator from Tennessee; and certainly affords no strong reason for exalting Mr. Calhoun.

If there has been any great saving under this system, the credit is due to the management of the Commissary General, Mr. Gibson, who is truly a man of business and economy. But surely Mr. Calhoun is not to be made President of the United States, because George Gibson is a very good Commissary General.

The rapidity with which the old Army accounts have been brought to a close, is owing chiefly to the diligence of the Third Auditor, Peter Hagner, an intelligent, industrious, and vigilant officer, and who was so before Mr. Calhoun was known in the War Department.

All the credit due to these officers, and all others attached to the War Department, is carefully collected to form a stock of merit for the Army Candidate, in this his time of need; but to be restored, with interest, as soon as he shall become President of the United States.

These great savings, which are attributed to the Secretary of War, sound well in debate, and look well upon paper,—but will not bear the test of examination.

In the Columbia Telescope, of S. Carolina, of 16th April, 1822, by way of shewing what immense savings Mr. Calhoun has made for the nation, we have the following statement of the expenditures of the Army for five years—

" For the year 1818	-	-	-	\$3,702,495,04
1819	-	-	-	3,384,731,95
1820	-	-	-	2,816,414,11
1821	-	-	-	1,180,093,53
Estimate for 1822	-	-	-	1,800,424,85"

The good People of South Carolina, who verily believe, that they have "given to the nation, the ablest man who ever filled the War Department;" also believe that this great man by his superior economy, has made all the reduction in the expenditures of the army, that would appear, by the above statement; and that in 1822 for instance, he saved to the nation nearly two millions of dollars.

The sum of expenditures for 1822, is stated *by estimate*, that is, by guess work, and is too low, by nearly 129,000 Dollars; and the sums stated for 1820 and 21, are still more remote from the truth, as will appear from more authentic statements, made by Mr. Calhoun's friends at Washington.

The day before this great display of Mr. Calhoun's savings was made in South Carolina, a similar display was made at the Seat of Government. Mr. Sterling, of New York, Mr. Calhoun's confidential friend, in a speech in the House of Representatives, by way of shewing "that the expences of the army had been reduced to an extent, and with a rapidity truly surprizing," gives the following statements:*

<i>"Cost per man.</i>		<i>Reduction.</i>
\$451.00	for the year 1818	
434.79	1819	\$16.87
315.88	1820	135.69
287.02	1821	164.55
299.46	1822	153.11

"The proportion of the officers to the men in 1822, being greater than before, prevents the result of that year from being as favorable as prior to that time.

"Again; the whole expences of the army since 1818, have decreased as follows, viz—

		No. of Army	
" 1818	\$3,702,495.04		8,199
1819	3,663,735.16	-	8,428
1820	3,061,884.00	-	9,693
1821	2,327,552.13	-	8,109
1822	1,929,179.91	-	6,441"

This statement, although very erroneous, particularly in the last item, is a much nearer approach to the truth than that of South Carolina. Mr. Sterling was at the seat of government, and had the best opportunities of acquiring information. His statements have a more imposing appearance, and have had more weight than any others upon this subject, and therefore are more worthy of examination.

The first thing that strikes us, in looking at these statements, is, that the whole come within the period of Mr. Calhoun's administration of the War Department, and afford us the opportunity of comparing Mr. Calhoun

*See National Intelligencer, 23d April, 1822.

of 1818 with Mr. Calhoun of 1822, by which it would appear that, between those two periods, he had altered his practical economy much for the better.

If the affairs of his Department, however, were not managed in 1822 with more economy than they should have been, which will not be pretended, then they must have been managed with the utmost profusion and extravagance in 1818 and '19.

If the Army was not supported in 1818 more economically than at the rate of 45 dollars per man, under a contract system, in time of profound peace, it must have been because that system was badly administered.

The Commissariat system began to go into operation in that year. The Commissary General, and other officers subordinate to him, were appointed and under pay, and no doubt performed some services. It must be allowed, however, that the beneficial effects of the system could not be immediately realized. But in 1819 the system was in full operation, and yet very little improvement then took place in the expenditures of the War Department; not more than should have resulted from the reduced price of all articles necessary for the support of an Army at that time.

Under a well regulated contract system, in time of peace, the Army may be as cheaply, but perhaps not as well, supplied as under a Commissariat system. In fact the present Commissariat system, so far as it respects the purchase of supplies for the Army, is essentially a contract system, as will appear by the 7th section of the act of the 14th April, 1818, regulating the Staff of the Army, viz: "That the supplies for the Army, unless in particular and urgent cases, the Secretary of War should otherwise direct, shall be purchased by contract to be made by the Commissary General, on public notice, to be delivered, on inspection, in bulk, and at such places as shall be stipulated; which contract shall be made under such regulations as the Secretary of War shall direct."

The most important difference between the two systems is this: that under the one, the contracts for supplies were made by the immediate direction of the Secretary of

War—under the other, by the immediate direction of the Commissary General; which, for the time being, is certainly a great improvement.

In 1819 the expense of supporting the Army, under the Commissariat system, was at the rate of \$434 70 per man. In 1822, under the same system, it was at the rate of \$299 46 per man. And Mr. Sterling was truly surprised that it cost us so little in the latter year, but forgot to be surprised that it cost us so much in the former.

The pay of a private is 5 dollars per month—for the year	\$60 00
In 1822 the rations might have been had at 12 cents each	43 80
Clothing at \$1 75 per month	21 00
Other expenses, estimated at	5 20
	<hr/>
	\$130 00

The privates ought to cost us annually about 130 dollars each.

In 1822 the average expence of the Army, officers included, was at the rate of \$299 46 (say 300 dollars) per man. But this, Mr. Sterling's opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, was much more than it ought to have been.

Will our farmers and planters, whose hard earnings are taken to support an Army of six thousand men at the annual rate of 300 dollars each, be persuaded that their money, in this case, is expended with a degree of economy *truly surprizing*?

The country labors under great pecuniary distress, from which we cannot anticipate any speedy relief—the produce of agriculture sells at a price that will scarcely defray the expense of transporting it to market—and at no period of our history could the articles necessary for clothing our troops be had at so cheap a rate. And is our Army still to cost us at the rate of three hundred dollars per man?

Unless the articles necessary for the support of an Army shall command a better price than they have for two or three years past, the Army can and must be supported at a cheaper rate than it has been.

But, if three hundred dollars per man be considered as a reasonable rate of expenditure for 1822, how is the

Secretary to account for his extravagance in 1819? Why should our troops cost us \$135 24 more per man in that year than in the year 1822? Why this waste of public money?

Had it been the object of Mr. Sterling to shew to the people whose money must support our standing Army, the profusion and extravagance of the Secretary in 1818, '19, and '20, he could not have done it more effectually than by the statements he has exhibited.

Well may Mr. Calhoun exclaim, "Save me from my friends."

For once I will endeavor to do it, by removing some of the unfavorable impressions which these statements are calculated to make.

The Army, according to Mr. Sterling's statement, in 1818, cost us per man \$451 00—in the year 1822. \$299 46—making a difference of \$151 54. But the whole of this difference ought not to be charged to the extravagance of the Secretary of War.

In the first place, Mr. Sterling has swelled up the aggregate of the Army for 1822 beyond the limit of its organization, which, under the law of the 2nd March, 1821, is fixed at 6,183 men, officers included, as appears by the return of the acting Adjutant General of the 9th of November, 1822.

The ranks of the Army, however, will rarely be full agreeably to this organization. In 1822 the aggregate of the Army amounted to 5,211 men, officers included. This appears by the return of the acting Adjutant General of the 12th of November, 1822. And this return, signed by the acting Adjutant General, to make it very strong is also signed by the Major General, but in what capacity, whether as Commander in Chief, or as assistant acting Adjutant General, does not appear by the record. It goes, however, to shew that the Major General has something to do at Washington, notwithstanding all the Radicals have said to the contrary.

Mr. Sterling's rate of expense per man for 1822 should be increased more than 20 per cent: that is, he should have divided the whole expense of the Army for

that year by 5,211, the actual number of men in service, instead of 6,442, his estimated number. This would give the sum of \$151.54, and reduce the difference from \$151.54 to \$80.79 cents per man.

There are other circumstances to be taken into the calculation. To make up the annual amounts of the expenditures of the Army, from which Mr. Stirling has taken his rates of expense, he includes the charges for the pay, subsistence, forage, bounties, and premiums, and other expenses of recruiting—Hospital department contingencies and quarter master's department, but excludes the expense of the Military Academy.

In the year 1818, the transportation account of the officers alone, amounted to \$48,341. In 1822, to a comparatively small sum.

In the year 1818, the recruiting service cost \$155,878. In 1822, no more than \$23,579—Most of the contingst expenses of the army were greater in 1818, than in 1822.

It is not doubted, but that the Commissary General, has made considerable savings in his Department, by his care and diligence in forming contracts for supplies. If to all this, we add, what has been gained by the reduciiion in the pricos of all articles necessary, for the supply of an army since 1818, about 33 1-3 per cent. on an ave-
rage, we shall find that Mr. Sterling's great difference in the rate of the expense of the army in 1818 and 1822, can be accounted for, without considering Mr. Calhoun more extravagagant in the former year than in the latter, or more economical in the latter year than in the former.

In fact, so far as regards his particu!ar agency, there seems to be but little change in his system of economy, either for the better or the worse, since he came into office.

But there are certain supposed great savings upon a variety of contracts, the merit of which more exclusively belongs to the Secretary.

In a debate on the contract for delivering stone at the Rip Raps, one of his friends deelared "that he was au-
thorized to say, that, if Mr. Mix had not taken this con-
tract, a loss would have been occasioned to the United

States of 75,000 dollars—the contract having been taken by Mr. Dix at half a dollar per perch less than was just about to be contracted for by another person."

That this circumstance has not been published among the strong reasons for raising Mr. Calhoun to the Presidency, may possibly be owing to the great modesty of his friends. As, however, they seem in a fair way to recover of that, we may still have these 75,000 dollars exhibited among the great savings in the War Department. After which, we may also have an account of great savings on other contracts for fortifications. On the cont act for advancing the public money to build a Powder Mill for Mr. Buzzard. On the contracts for cannon, howitzers, shot shells. &c. for the last five years; and more especially on the contracts with the Messrs. Jonhsons, for transporting our army from Ft. Lonis to Council Bluffs; all which will require an impartial and careful examination.

CASSIUS.





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